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Abstract
We quantify the macroeconomic and welfare effects of alternative fiscal consolidation
plans in the context of a small open economy. Using an overlapping generations model
tailored to the Australian economy, we examine immediate and gradual eliminations of the
existing fiscal deficit with (i) temporary income tax hikes, (ii) temporary consumption tax
hikes and (iii) temporary transfer payment cuts. The simulation results indicate that all
three fiscal measures result in favourable long-run macroeconomic and welfare outcomes,
but have adverse consequences in the short run that are particularly severe under the
immediate fiscal consolidation plan. Moreover, our results show that cutting transfer
payments leads to the worst welfare outcome for all generations currently alive. Increasing
the consumption tax rate results in smaller welfare losses, but compared to raising income
taxes, the current poor households pay much larger welfare costs. The adverse effects
on wellbeing of current generations highlight political constraints when implementing a
fiscal consolidation plan. However, after compensating current generations for all welfare
losses, there is still an overall efficiency gain. This implies possibilities to devise a fiscal
consolidation plan supported by a compensation scheme to improve wellbeing of future
generations.
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1 Introduction
Recent unfavourable macroeconomic conditions have put many advanced economies in a tough
fiscal situation with large budget deficits and rapidly growing government debt. According
to IMF (2010), Japan tops the list with a gross government debt-GDP ratio well over 200%.
Greece is the second with gross debt over 150% of GDP. Countries with gross government
debt-GDP ratios over 100% include Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and the United States. Major
European countries face a similar debt problem. France and the United Kingdom are in the
80%-100% range, as is fiscally responsible Germany. Persistently sluggish economic growth has
prevented the normal cyclical improvement in fiscal balances. Accordingly, fiscal consolidation
has become a topical policy issue in Europe and America.
Among advanced economies, Australia stands out as a special case as it has not experienced
any economic recession over the last 25 years. However, since the global financial crisis, it
has suffered from significant fiscal deficits that have resulted in fast-growing government debt.
Specifically, the underlying cash deficit reached 4.2% of GDP in 2010 and 3.1% of GDP in 2014,
with net (gross) Commonwealth government debt amounting to 12.8% (over 20%) in June 2014
(Australian Government, 2015). Similarly to many other developed countries, the Australian
government is committed to returning its budget to surplus as soon as possible. According
to the recent government projections in the 2015-16 Federal Budget (Australian Government,
2015), the government plans to gradually eliminate budget deficits by 2020, with a modest
surplus of 0.4% of GDP forecasted for the final projection year of 2026.
A number of fiscal consolidation measures have been proposed to achieve this goal, including
temporary tax increases and/or spending cuts. There is a significant degree of uncertainty
regarding achieving this projected path to budget surpluses. Undoubtedly, the proposed budget
repair measures will have some unpleasant macroeconomic and welfare impacts. However,
ambiguity over potential outcomes of the proposed budget repair measures and disagreement on
the timing of these interventions have exacerbated uncertainty and therefore stimulated heated
debates among the Australian public and policymakers. More specifically, there are no clear
answers to several fundamental questions: What exactly are the macroeconomic effects during
the austerity period and in the long run? What are the effects on the wellbeing of households?
Which households and generations will be the winners or losers and how much will they gain or
lose comparatively? Which combination of policy actions is the most preferable - weighing up
the macroeconomic effects and the implications for intergenerational and distributional equity?
In this paper, we aim to address these questions in the context of a dynamic general equi-
librium, overlapping generations (OLG) framework. In particular, we aim to quantify and
compare the economy-wide implications of several budget repair measures to achieve either
the immediate elimination of the 2014 budget deficit (in 2015) or the gradual elimination of
the existing budget deficit (starting in 2015), as projected by Australian Government (2015).
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These fiscal policy measures include: (i) temporary increases in the progressive income taxes;
(ii) temporary increases in the consumption tax rate; and (iii) temporary cuts in the transfer
payments. We are especially interested in the welfare implications for different age cohorts and
household income types. Understanding these implications (and the macroeconomic effects) of
the examined budget repair measures in the Australian context will benefit not only Australian
fiscal policy but also other small open economies facing similar problems with large budget
deficits and rapidly-growing public debt.
To undertake this quantitative analysis, we employ a small open economy OLG model that
is calibrated to the Australian economy. The model comprises overlapping generations of het-
erogeneous households, perfectly competitive firms, a government sector incorporating essential
fiscal policy settings, and a foreign sector with an exogenous interest rate. The heterogeneous
households are different with respect to ages and skill types. The government sector consists
of various public transfer programs and a variety of tax financing instruments such as pro-
gressive income, consumption, superannuation and corporate taxes. The government can also
issue debt to finance its fiscal deficits. Importantly, the economic decisions made by households
and firms (i.e., labour supply, saving and investment decisions) are subject to the distortions
introduced by the fiscal policy. The rich structure of household heterogeneity and the detailed
composition of government fiscal activities are essential to study the effects of various budget
repair measures on macro aggregates and wellbeing of different households.
We first discipline households in our model to mimic the lifecycle behaviour of Australian
households, including labour supply and earnings and pension payments observed from the
household survey data. We also calibrate our benchmark economy to target key Australian
macroeconomic aggregates, the government budget deficits and net debt between 2000 and
2014. Next, we compute the baseline transition that assumes an unchanged budget deficit-
GDP ratio (as observed in 2014) and allows for net government debt to gradually increase to
a new steady state debt implied by the current budget deficit. Finally, we apply our model to
simulate the two fiscal consolidation plans achieved by either increasing tax rates or cutting
social benefits, and compare their macroeconomic and welfare effects with those derived under
the baseline transition.
Our simulation results indicate that while all three budget measures achieve the same fiscal
goal (of reducing and eventually eliminating government debt), the macroeconomic and welfare
effects of each budget measure differ significantly across households, generations and over time.
More specifically, each examined fiscal measure results in favourable long-run macroeconomic
and welfare outcomes, but have adverse short run consequences that are particularly severe
under the immediate fiscal consolidation plan. The current generations born before the fiscal
consolidation are likely not be supportive of any of the fiscal measures as they would suffer
significant welfare losses of (on average) up to 12% in their remaining resources due to cuts
in transfer payments (including age pensions) or facing higher tax rates. In contrast, future
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generations are shown to experience welfare gains of up to 0.8% in their lifetime resources, as a
result of no public debt in the long run allowing for smaller taxes or higher transfer payments.
We show that taxing consumption or income leads to opposing macroeconomics and welfare
implications. In particular, temporary increases in the consumption tax rate generate only
small economic distortions with the impact on per capita labour supply, assets and output
being modest, but they reduce the welfare of poor households most. Conversely, temporary
increases in progressive income tax rates have largely negative effects on the economy, but
reduce the welfare of poor households least. Moreover, there are interesting welfare trade-offs
when choosing between transfer payment cuts and tax hikes. Cutting the transfer payments
results in the largest welfare losses for current low-income generations, but the highest welfare
gains for future generations, compared to the two tax measures.
In general, our results highlight challenges for the government when implementing any of
the proposed budget repair measures. We show that each of the fiscal consolidation plans im-
proves the wellbeing of future generations, but at the expense of large welfare losses borne by
current generations. However, when we introduce a system of income transfers administered
by a hypothetical Lump Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA), we find positive overall effi-
ciency/welfare outcomes. This implies that it is possible to devise a fiscal consolidation plan to
improve wellbeing of future generations, if the government introduces a redistribution program
to offset the adverse effects of budget repair measures on current generations.
Related studies. Our paper contributes to several branches of the literature. There is
a fairly large body of literature that has been devoted to analysing the macroeconomic and
distributional effects of fiscal policy. Jager and Keuschnigg (1991) examine the burden of
increased public debt in open economies, using a numerical overlapping generations model with
inelastic labour supply. Baxter and King (1993) use an infinitely-lived, representative agent
model to explore the general equilibrium effects of changes in government spending and tax
financing instruments. Heathcote (2005) investigates the effects of tax cuts in a heterogeneous
agent model with infinitely-lived agents and incomplete markets. Fehr and Ruocco (1999)
investigate the distributional and efficiency consequences of the Italian debt reduction, whereas
Kitao (2010), using a similar large-scale OLG model, examines the effects of temporary tax cuts
and rebate transfers in the US. Recently, Imrohoroglu et al. (2016) develop a large-scale OLG
model to measure the effects of pension and tax reforms on pension and non-pension deficits
in Japan. Glomm et al. (forthcoming) quantify the macroeconomic and welfare effects of fiscal
austerity measures in Greece. In this paper, we also use an OLG model, but focus on the fiscal
consolidation in Australia that has a fast-growing but relatively low government debt, which is
far below the steady state level implied by the existing budget deficit.
There is also a growing body of macroeconomic literature that analyses the effects of public
debt financing. Erceg and Linde (2012) study the effects of fiscal consolidation in relation to
whether monetary policy is constrained by a currency union membership or by the zero lower
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bound on policy rates. Forni et al. (2010) quantify the macroeconomic implications of perma-
nently reducing the public debt to GDP ratio in euro area countries. Chen and Imrohoroglu
(2016), using a neoclassical growth model, investigate the consequences of different tax policies
to reduce government debt for the US economy. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2016) build a similar
model to quantify the impact of different tax policies needed to restore fiscal balance in Japan.
Notice that since these papers use a representative agent framework, they abstract from inter-
generational and distributional effects of fiscal consolidations. Our paper is complementary to
these papers as we incorporate agent heterogeneity and a variety of government activities into
our model. We can analyse not only the aggregate welfare effect but also the distributional
welfare effects within and across cohorts.
Finally, we contribute directly to the literature evaluating the economic effects of fiscal
policy in Australia. The core models for fiscal projections and policy analyses by the Fed-
eral Treasury (Australian Government, 2015) and the Productivity Commission (Productivity
Commission, 2013) are micro-simulation models, which abstract from modelling microfounda-
tions of household behaviour. Contrary to the micro-simulation approach, there is a growing
body of literature, using general equilibrium OLG models that incorporate the behaviour of
households and firms to analyse the impacts of fiscal policy reforms in Australia (e.g., Kudrna
and Woodland (2011a, b) and Kudrna et al., 2015). We extend these studies by incorporating
a more detailed disaggregation of households into income quintiles, technical progress and the
government’s ability to issue public debt. Notably, this paper is the first attempt to evaluate
the welfare effects of the proposed budget repair measures, using an OLG model calibrated to
the Australian economy.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets up a dynamic, general equilibrium
OLG model used for the fiscal policy analysis and Section 3 provides details on the calibration
of the model. In Section 4, we examine a range of policy experiments to eliminate the existing
fiscal deficit, with the results presented in terms of macroeconomic and welfare implications.
Section 5 performs a sensitivity analysis of alternative assumptions of the model. Section 6
offers some concluding remarks.1
2 Model
The model is essentially a small open economy variant of Auerbach and Kotlikoff’s (1987) model
augmented to capture key features of the Australian economy and that consists of household,
production, government and foreign sectors. The detailed description of the model and a
1The paper also contains an appendix with the results for alternative budget repair measures, and there is also
an online technical appendix, which provides further details on the specification, calibration and computation
of the model, and some additional results. The online technical appendix is available on the authors’ website.
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definition of its competitive equilibrium are provided below.2
2.1 Demographics, endowments and preferences
Demographics. The model economy is populated by 70 overlapping generations aged 21
to 90 years (j = 21, ..., 90) in every year t. Every year, a new generation aged 21 years
enters the model structure and faces random survival with the maximum possible lifespan of
70 years, while the oldest generation aged 90 years dies. Lifespan uncertainty is described
by the conditional survival probabilities, pij. The model assumes stationary demographics
with a constant population growth rate, n, which implies time-invariant cohort shares, µj =
[pijupslope (1 + n)]µj−1.
Endowments. Each cohort consists of five skill (or income) types i - the lowest, second,
third, fourth and highest quintiles that are distinguished by their exogenously given labour
productivity and social welfare payments. The skill type is pre-determined and unchanged over
the life span and time periods. We denote the intra-generational shares by ωi.
In each period of life, households of age j in time t are endowed with hj,t unit of labour
time that has earning ability (efficiency unit) given by eij. Following Kotlikoff et al. (2007), we
incorporate a time-augmenting technical progress to ensure that the model is consistent with
a well-defined balanced growth path. This approach assumes that the time endowment, hj,t,
increases for every successive generation at the rate of technological progress, g, according to
hj,t = (1 + g)hj,t−1.3 The efficiency unit, eij, is skill and age dependent. Similarly to Altig et
al. (2001), eij is assumed to increase due to the accumulation of human capital and also due to
technical progress that makes the labour productivity profile steeper for each skill type.
Preferences. Each i-type household who begins her economic life at time t chooses con-
sumption, c, and leisure, l, at each age j to maximize the expected lifetime utility function
given by
U it = Et
[
90∑
j=21
βj−21
(
j∏
z=21
piz−1
)
u(cit+j−21, l
i
t+j−21)
1− 1
γ
1− 1
γ
]
, (1)
where the annual CES utility, u(c, l) =
[
c(1−1/ρ) + αl(1−1/ρ)
]1/(1−1/ρ)
, being discounted by the
subjective discount factor, β, and the unconditional survival probability,
∏j
z=21 piz−1. The re-
maining parameters in (1) are the inter- and intra-temporal elasticities of substitution denoted
2The model is an extended version of the general equilibrium OLG model developed for the Australian econ-
omy by Kudrna and Woodland (2011a, b). The extensions include (i) a detailed intra-generational heterogeneity
based on income distribution data from Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2007), (ii) technical progress
and (iii) a detailed calibration of the fiscal structure.
3Notice that the typical approach of accounting for technical progress by multiplying the labour input in
the production function by a growing productivity factor would not be compatible with a long run equilibrium
path in our setup with CES preferences (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987, p.35). We therefore assume the time
augmenting technical change, which implies that in a steady state, all household variables as well as aggregate
variables (defined in per capita terms later in the text) grow at the rate of technical progress.
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by γ and ρ and the leisure preference parameter, α.
2.2 Technology and adjustment cost
The production sector contains a large number of perfectly competitive firms that produce a
single all-purpose output good that can be consumed, invested in production capital or traded
internationally.
Production function. The production technology is described by a CES production
function
F (Kt, Lt) = κ
[
εK
(1−1/σ)
t + (1− ε)L(1−1/σ)t
][1/(1−1/σ)]
,
where Kt is the capital stock, Lt is the labour input, κ is the productivity constant, ε is the
capital intensity parameter and σ is the elasticity of substitution in production.
Adjustment cost. The firms face adjustment costs when accumulating new capital. As in
Fehr (2000), we assume that adjustment costs can occur only during the transition according
to the following function
C(I t, Kt) = 0.5ψ
(
It
Kt
−[n+ g + n · g + δ]
)2
Kt,
where ψ is the adjustment cost coefficient and δ is the capital depreciation rate. Notice that
there are no adjustment costs when the economy is in a steady state as I = (n+ g + n · g + δ)K.
However, along the transition paths when the capital stock is below or above the steady state
level, firms optimally smooth out their investment expenditures.4
2.3 Fiscal policy
Public pension. The model incorporates main features of the two publicly stipulated pillars
of Australia’s retirement income policy. The first is a publicly-managed ”safety net” pillar that
is represented by a means tested age pension financed through general taxation revenues.
The age pension, pij,t, is paid to households of skill type i and age pension age (j ≥ 65) if
they satisfy the following income test.5 Let pmax denote the maximum age pension paid by the
government to pensioners provided that their assessable income does not exceed the income
4The CES production technology assumption is based on the findings of empirical literature that estimates σ
to be lower than one. Karanassou and Sala (2010) estimate this parameter to be 0.56 for Australia. In addition,
the capital adjustment cost assumption is based on the previous literature (for instance, see Altig et al. (2001)
and Kotlikoff et al., 2007). More importantly, accounting for the firm’s convex costs of installing new capital
goods is consistent with the observed lags in the investment process. We will relax these assumptions in the
sensitivity analysis section.
5The actual means test of the age pension also includes the asset test and it is the binding test (the income
test or the asset test resulting in a lower pension benefit) that is used to determine the pension payment. The
model considers only the income test as it affects most of part age pensioners.
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threshold, y. The maximum pension, pmax, is then reduced at the pension taper (withdrawal)
rate, θ, for every dollar of assessable income above y. Algebraically, the age pension benefit for
the age-eligible households can be written as
pij,t = max
{
min
{
pmax, pmax − θ (ŷij,t − y)} , 0} , j ≥ 65, (2)
where the assessable income, ŷij,t, consists of interest income, rA
i
j−1,t−1, and half of labour
earnings, 0.5× wteijlsij,t. The means-tested pension benefit function is plotted in Figure A1 in
the online technical appendix, which provides more detail on the modelling (and calibration)
of the age pension. The total expenditure of the public pension program is given by
Pt =
∑5
i=1 ωi
∑90
j=65 p
i
j,t µj,
where ωi and µj denote intra- and inter-generational shares.
Private pension. The second pillar is represented by mandatory, privately-managed re-
tirement saving accounts, which are based on defined contributions made by employers and
are regulated by the government. This private pension program, known as the Superannua-
tion Guarantee, requires employers to contribute a given percentage of gross wages into the
employee’s superannuation fund.
Accordingly, the model assumes that mandatory contributions are made by firms on behalf of
working households at the contribution rate, ν, from their gross labour earnings, wte
i
jls
i
j,t. The
contributions net of the contribution tax, τ s ·ν, are added to the stock of superannuation assets,
ŝij,t, which earns investment income at the after-tax interest rate, (1− τ r) r. The superannuation
asset accumulation can be expressed as
ŝij,t = [1 + (1− τ r) r] ŝij−1,t−1 + (1− τ s) ν · wteijlsij,t, j ≤ 60, ŝi20,t = 0, (3)
where r the market interest rate, τ r and τ s denote the earnings and contribution tax rates
paid by the superannuation fund. The superannuation assets must be kept in the fund until
households reach age 60 when the accumulation ceases and households are assumed to receive
their accumulated balances as lump sum payouts. It is further assumed that working households
aged 60 years are paid mandatory contributions directly into their private asset accounts.
Therefore, superannuation payouts denoted by sij,t in (8) may be expressed as
sij,t =

0 j < 60
ŝi60,t j = 60
(1− τ s) ν · wteijlsij,t j > 60.
(4)
Social welfare. The government also runs a social welfare program that pays the social
welfare benefits, stij,t, to households aged j < 65. These benefits are skill-dependent (targeted
8
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
to lower income households) and determined exogenously (with further details provided in the
calibration section). The total social welfare payment, STt, is given by
STt =
∑5
i=1 ωi
∑64
j=21 st
i
j,t µj.
Taxes. The government collects taxes to finance its spending programs. The total tax
revenue, Tt, consists of revenues from five different taxes: household progressive income tax,
T Yt , consumption tax, T
C
t , superannuation tax paid by the superannuation fund, T
S
t , and other
household tax, TLSt , as well as corporate tax paid by firms, T
F
t . The per capita tax receipts in
period t are given by
T Yt =
∑5
i=1 ωi
∑90
j=21 τ(y
i
j,t) µj
TCt =
∑5
i=1 ωi
∑90
j=21 τ
c
t c
i
j,t µj (5)
T St =
∑5
i=1 ωi
∑60
j=21
[
τ sν · wteijlsij,t + τ rr · ŝij−1,t−1
]
µj
TLSt =
∑5
i=1 ωi
∑90
j=21 τ
i µj
T Ft = τ
f%t,
where τ(yij,t) is the income tax payment paid by individual households; τ
c
t represents the con-
sumption tax rate; τ i denotes other household taxes assumed to be collected as lump sum
taxes within each skill type i; τ f is the corporate tax rate imposed on the firm’s profit, %t;
ωi and µj denote intra- and inter-generational shares. The total tax revenue is then given by
Tt = T
Y
t + T
C
t + T
S
t + T
LS
t + T
F
t .
Budget balance. The government activities include an issue of new debt, ∆Dt+1 = Dt+1−
Dt, and tax revenues, Tt, that finance general government consumption expenditure, Gt, interest
payments on current public debt, rDt, and transfer payments to households, TRt = Pt + STt.
In each period, the government budget constraint is balanced, so that
∆Dt+1 + Tt = Gt + rDt + TRt. (6)
Note that in our setting, the issue of new government debt (or the change in net government
debt) in period t is equal to the budget deficit in that period.
2.4 Markets
We employ a small open economy framework since that description best fits the Australian
economy.
In our small open economy model, the domestic capital market is fully integrated with the
world capital market. Capital freely moves across borders, so that the domestic interest rate, r,
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is exogenously set by the world interest rate, rw.6 There is no interaction between the domestic
and international labour markets. The domestic labour market is isolated from rest of the
world. The wage rate adjusts to clear the domestic labour market in equilibrium. Finally,
it is assumed that there is no difference between domestically and internationally produced
consumption goods.
Letting AFt stand for the (per capita) net foreign assets at the beginning of t, the interna-
tional budget constraint can be specified as
(1 + n)(1 + g)AFt+1 − AFt = rAFt +Xt, (7)
where the left side of (7) represents per capita capital flows and the right side is the current
account comprising the per capita net trade balance denoted by Xt, and the per capita interest
receipts (payments) from foreign assets (debt), rAFt .
2.5 Household problem
Households are assumed to make optimal consumption/saving and leisure/labour supply choices
by solving a utility maximization problem with the objective function (1) subject to the per-
period budget constraints written as
aij,t = (1 + r)a
i
j−1,t−1 + wte
i
jls
i
j,t + p
i
a,t + s
i
j,t
+ stij,t + b
i
j,t − cij,t − taxij,t. (8)
In (8), aij,t denotes the stock of ordinary private assets held at the end of age j and time
t, which equals the assets at the beginning of the period, plus the sum of interest income,
raij−1,t−1, gross labour earnings, wte
i
jls
i
j,t, public age pension payments, p
i
j,t, private superannu-
ation payouts, sij,t, social welfare payments, st
i
j,t, and bequest receipts, b
i
j,t, minus the sum of
consumption, cij,t, and total household taxes denoted by tax
i
j,t.
The gross labour earnings are equal to the product of labour supply, lsij,t = hj,t−lij,t, and the
hourly wage, wte
i
j, where wt is the market wage rate and e
i
j is the age- and skill-specific earnings
ability variable. Notice that the labour supply is required to be non-negative and constrained
by the time endowment, 0 ≤ lsij,t ≤ hj,t. Thus, when the agent chooses to allocate all time
endowment to leisure, lij,t = hj,t, that agent must be fully retired from workforce, ls
i
j,t = 0.
The household taxes in (8) include the progressive income, consumption and other taxes,
taxij,t = τ(y
i
j,t) + τ
c
tc
i
j,t + τ
i. The progressive income tax, τ(yij,t), is a function of the taxable
income, yij,t, which comprises labour earnings and assets income.
Following Gokhale et al. (2001), we abstract from intended bequests, with all inter-
6The exogenous interest rate assumption is relaxed in Section 5, which examines how sensitive the results
are to the imperfect capital mobility assumption with an endogenous interest rate.
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generational transfers being accidental. The accidental bequests, bij,t, are calculated by ag-
gregating the assets of deceased agents within each skill type i and equally redistributing them
to all surviving i-type agents aged between 45 and 65 years. The model is a pure life cy-
cle model in the sense that households are assumed to be born with no wealth and exhaust
all wealth if survive to the maximum age of 90 (i.e., ai20,t = a
i
90,t+70 = 0). We also impose
borrowing constraints (i.e., aij,t ≥ 0) to prevent younger households from borrowing against
their superannuation (private pension) payouts, as such borrowing is prohibited by the current
legislation.
2.6 Firm problem
The perfectly competitive firms demand capital, Kt, labour, Lt, and gross investment, It, to
maximize the present value of all future profits subject to the (per capita) capital accumulation
equation:
max
{Kt, Lt, It}
∞∑
t=0
Dt
[(
1− τ f) %t]
s.t. (1 + n)(1 + g)Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt,
(9)
where %t = (F (Kt, Lt)− C(It, Kt)− It − (1 + ν)wtLt) is the firm’s profit comprising the sale of
output, minus the costs of capital formation and of the labour input, Dt = (1+n)
t(1+g)t/(1+
r)t is the discount rate adjusted by population and economic growth, and τ f stands for the
corporation tax rate. Notice that labour costs also include the superannuation contributions
made by firms at the mandatory rate ν on gross labour earnings.
Solving the profit maximization problem (9) yields the first-order necessary conditions and
gives expressions for the equilibrium wage rate, wt, interest rate, r, and capital price, qt.
2.7 Competitive equilibrium
Given government policy settings for the taxation and pension systems, the demographic struc-
ture and the world interest rate, a competitive equilibrium is such that
(a) households make optimal consumption and leisure decisions by maximizing their lifetime
utility (1) subject to their budget constraint (8);
(b) competitive firms choose labour and capital inputs to solve their profit maximization prob-
lem in (9);
(c) the government budget constraint (6) is satisfied;
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(d) the labour, capital and goods markets clear
Lt =
∑5
i=1 ωi
∑90
j=21 e
i
j ls
i
j,t µj,
qtKt =
∑5
i=1 ωi
∑90
j=21(a
i
j−1,t−1 + ŝ
i
j−1,t−1)µj + A
F
t −Dt, (10)
Yt =
∑5
i=1 ωi
∑90
j=21 c
i
j,t µj + It +Gt +Xt.
(e) the bequest transfers are equal to the sum of the assets left by the deceased agents within
each skill type, bit =
∑
j (1− pij) (aij,t + ŝij,t)µj.7
3 Calibration
We now provide specific details on the calibration procedure that is to replicate or closely
approximate the key Australian macro data and fiscal indicators in 2014, including the budget
deficit and net government debt to GDP ratios in that year. As already mentioned, Australia
has only recently started accumulating public debt. Hence, the standard assumption of a steady
state equilibrium would not do the job in matching these two government indicators, as the
current budget deficit to GDP ratio would imply much larger government debt to GDP ratio
in a steady state than that observed from the data.8 We use the following alternative approach
that allows for 2014 - the base year for our fiscal policy analysis - to be a non-steady state year.
First, we compute the initial steady state that targets key Australian macroeconomic data
and fiscal indicators for the period of 2000-08.9 Given that the Australian government ran
small budget surpluses and had literally no debt during that period, we make an assumption of
a balanced government budget with zero public debt in this initial steady state. We calibrate
fiscal policy variables to match the observed ratios of government indicators to GDP averaged
over the period of 2000-08 (discussed further below). The values of the main parameters used
in this initial steady state and the sources are reported in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 around here
Second, we run the baseline transition from this initial steady state where we calibrate the
fiscal policy parameters to match the observed ratios of government revenues and expenditures
7We assume that accidental bequests are equally redistributed to surviving households of the same income
type aged between 45 and 65 years. This means that the bequests received by higher income households are
significantly larger than those received by lower income types.
8In a steady state, the net government debt to GDP ratio can be derived from the budget constraint in (6) as
Deficit GDP/ (n+ g + ng) . Given the rates of population growth and technical progress and the budget deficit
of 3.07% of GDP in 2014, the implied steady state net debt would equal to 98.27% of GDP, compared to the
actual net debt of only 12.8% of GDP in 2014.
9We use the GAMS software to compute this steady state equilibrium (as well as the baseline and fiscal
policy transition paths that are discussed later in the text). Details on our algorithm are provided in the online
technical appendix.
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to GDP for the period of 2009-2014. As shown later in this section, this approach generates
net government debt that closely approximates the actual net public debt in 2014.
3.1 Demographics, endowments and preferences
Demographics. The demographic parameters include the age-specific survival rates, pij, and
the annual population growth rate, n, which are assumed to be time-invariant, implying con-
stant cohort shares, µj. We take pij as the average survival probability for males and females
from the 2011-13 life tables (ABS, 2014b) and set n to 1.6%, which is the annual population
growth rate from 2013 to 2014. Given the chosen values for the two demographic factors, the
model generates an old-age dependency ratio of 0.22, which is similar to the actual dependency
ratio in 2014. The intra-generational shares, ωi, are equal to 0.2 for each skill or income type
of households in the model, based on the quintiles used by ABS (2007).
Endowments. There are five skill types (i.e., income quintiles) in each cohort, which differ
by their exogenously given earnings ability (and social welfare benefits and other household
taxes that are discussed in the subsection on the calibration of fiscal policy). The earnings
ability profiles are constructed using the estimated lifetime wage function taken from Reilly et
al. (2005) and the income distribution shift parameters derived from ABS (2007). In particular,
the earnings ability profile for the third quintile in the model is taken from Reilly et al. and
is adjusted for technical progress in the same way as in Altig et al. (2001).10 The earnings
ability profiles for lower and higher income quintiles are shifted down and up, using the shift
parameters, to approximately replicate the private income distribution in Australia.11 Based on
ABS (2007) data, the shift parameter is set to 0.26 for the lowest quintile, 0.55 for the second
quintile, 1.0 for the third quintile, 1.52 for the fourth quintile and 2.63 for the highest quintile.
Given that Reilly et al. (2005) considered only workers aged 15-65, the earnings ability after
age 65 is assumed to decline at a constant rate, reaching zero at age 90 for each income class.
Preferences. The functional form of household utility is standard in related literature.
Importantly, the values assigned to the utility parameters are similar to those used by others
(see, for example, Auerbach and Kolikoff (1987) and Fehr, 2000). We calibrate the subjective
discount factor, β, in the lifetime utility (1) to match the capital to output ratio (= 3.085).
10The growth-adjusted earnings ability profile for the third quintile takes the form: ea = exp(α0+(g+α1)X+
α2X
2), where parameters α0, α1 and α2 are taken from Reilly et al. as average estimates for males and females
with 12 education years, X represents years of potential experience (a− 5−education years) and g denotes the
rate of technical progress.
11It is also assumed that the two lower income types have 10 years of schooling and the two higher income
types 15 years of schooling, resulting in labour productivity profiles that differ not only by the level but also by
the shape (i.e., being relatively flat for lower income types compared to higher income types).
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3.2 Technology and adjustment cost
We use the CES production function and calibrate the elasticity of substitution parameter to
be σ = 0.78 in our benchmark model. As mentioned, this assumption is based on the empirical
literature that estimates σ to be lower than one for Australia (e.g., see Karanassou and Sala,
2010). Most of other production parameters are also calibrated to replicate calibration targets
such as the investment rate of 0.085. The wage rate, w, is normalized to one by calibrating the
value of the productivity constant, κ.
Following Auerbach and Kolikoff (1987), we set the adjustment cost parameter, ψ, in the
capital adjustment cost function to 10. The rate of technological progress, g, is set to 1.5% per
year, which is taken from Productivity Commission (2013). We will consider alternative as-
sumptions about the technology, capital adjustment costs and the rate of technological progress
in the sensitivity analysis section.
3.3 Fiscal policy
We base on the policy settings for the age pension, mandatory superannuation and taxation,
and their parameter values for the period between 2000 and 2014 to calibrate the fiscal policy
in the benchmark model. As discussed, we divide the calibration period into two sub-periods: a
steady state sub-period of 2000-08 when there was no fiscal deficit, and a transition sub-period
of 2009-14 when there were large budget deficits and growing government debt due to the global
financial crisis.
Table 2 reports on the calibration of fiscal policy in the initial steady state (2000-08) and in
the base year (2014). The statutory tax and transfer rates reported in column 1 are actual rates
set by the Australian government for 2013-14. The compositions of the government budget in
columns 2 and 3 are computed from data in Australian Government (2015). The effective tax
and transfer rates in columns 4 and 5 are calibrated to match the corresponding shares in
GDP in the initial steady state and in the base year. Technically, the effective rates are the
product of the statutory rates and adjustment factors. The details of our calibration strategy
are discussed below.
Insert Table 2 around here
Public pension. The age pension parameters (maximum benefit of $21,504 per year,
income test threshold of $4,056 per year and taper rate of 50 percent) relate to those applicable
for single pensioners from September 2013 to June 2014. The pension expenditure as the
share of GDP averaged over the period of 2000-08 and in 2014 is 2.5% and 2.93%, respectively.
Hence, the effective age pension payments are adjusted for each skill type to match these shares.
Specifically, the maximum pension benefit is adjusted down by 10% in the initial steady state
and up by 3% in 2014.
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Private pension. The mandatory superannuation contribution rate is 9.5% of gross earn-
ings, which is the effective rate in the model. However, the effective tax rates on superannuation
contributions and earnings in the model are lower than the statutory ones in data. We actually
have to scale down that the statutory rate in order to match its GDP shares in the initial steady
state and over the calibration period 2009-14. This is because of the private pension system is
fully mature in the model (with mandatory contributions at 9.5% of gross earnings made over
the entire working lives), whereas it has yet to achieve full maturity in Australia.
Social welfare. Using the ABS (2007) data, we calculate the share of social welfare in
gross total income for each income quintile, which is 0.44 for the lowest quintile, 0.3 for the
second quintile, 0.15 for the third quintile and 0.06 for the fourth quintile. These government
benefits include all social welfare payments such as family benefits, disability support pension
and unemployment benefit. In the calibration of our initial steady state, we compute the
skill-specific social welfare payments denoted by stij<65,t in (8) such that the model replicates
the aforementioned shares. Note that the social welfare benefits are assumed to be paid at a
constant (skill-specific) rate to eligible households (in the lowest to fourth income quintiles at
each age j < 65). During the calibration period 2009-14, the social welfare benefits are scaled
up (by 14% in 2014) to match increasing government expenditures on social welfare.
Taxes. The income tax rates are nonlinear and progressive. We use a differentiable income
tax function that is estimated to approximate the 2013-14 progressive income tax schedule.
The estimated income tax function is depicted by Figure A2 in the online technical appendix.
The figure shows that our function is a close approximation of the actual 2013-14 income tax
schedule. Nevertheless, our model does not account for tax deductions and also tax offsets
available for lower income earners. Therefore, in order to match the income tax revenue as the
exact share of GDP during the calibration period, the income tax function is scaled down with
the adjustment parameter of 0.82 and 0.77 in the initial steady state and in 2014, respectively.
The consumption and corporation income tax rates are linear with the statutory rates given
by 10% and 30%, respectively. In our calibration, we adjust these statutory rates to match the
actual ratios of the given tax revenue to GDP. The corporate effective tax rate is indeed smaller
in our calibration, reflecting the fact that many firms in reality use various other deductions
to lower their tax rate (and some operating in the informal sector paying no tax at all). As
indicated in Table 2, the effective consumption tax rate equals 12.8% in the initial steady state
and 11.3% in 2014. These effective rates are higher than the statutory Goods and Services
Tax (GST) rate of 10%. This is because we target the total consumption tax revenue, which
includes not only the GST revenue but also receipts from other indirect taxes.
The other tax, τ i, in (8) is assumed to be collected as a lump sum tax within each income
type and is to target the government non-taxation revenue, in order for the model to exactly
replicate the total revenue of the government budget. We use again the ABS (2007) data and
derive the share for each income type in the total taxes paid. These shares are 0.08 for the
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lowest quintile, 0.1 for the second quintile, 0.15 for the third quintile, 0.22 for the fourth quintile
and 0.45 for the highest quintile. In our calibration, we first calculate the other tax to match the
observed ratio of the non-taxation revenue to GDP. We then apply the above-mentioned shares
to derive skill-specific other taxes, which represent the third exogenous source of heterogeneity
among the five skill types of households in our model.
Deficit path. In addition to matching government tax revenues and expenditures over the
transition period of 2009-2014, we set the budget deficit to GDP ratios in the model to those
observed from the data during that period. This approach then generates net government debt
that is close to the actual net public debt in 2014 - the base year for the fiscal policy analysis
that is not a steady state year.12 We further assume that public consumption, Gt, adjusts
endogenously to balance the government budget in (6) with a growing public debt over the
period of 2009-14.
3.4 Markets
In our small open economy model, the domestic interest rate is exogenous and given by the
world interest rate, which is set to 4%. We also use the equilibrium condition for the capital
market in order to target the net foreign assets to capital ratio of −0.173 in the initial steady
state. This reflects the net foreign ownership of 17.3% of Australia’s capital stock averaged
over the period of 2000-08 (ABS, 2014a).
3.5 Model performance
The benchmark steady-state solution (2000-08) and the solutions in the selected years of the cal-
ibration period (2009-14) for the key macroeconomic and fiscal variables are reported in Table
3, which also provides a comparison with Australian data. The comparison of model generated
and actual macroeconomic indicators indicates that the model replicates the Australian econ-
omy fairly well. Importantly, the model exactly matches the observed budget deficit to GDP
ratios over the calibration period of 2009-2014 and closely approximates the net government
debt in % of GDP in 2014.13
Insert Table 3 around here
12As mentioned, this approach involves solving for the baseline transition path, where we use the parameter
values presented in Table 1 and apply the Gauss-Seidel algorithm that is specified in the online technical
appendix.
13Our model does also a good job in approximating the lifecycle behaviour of Australian households observed
from the HILDA surveys (Wooden at al., 2002). The comparison of lifecycle labour supply, labour earnings and
pension payments generated by the model for the initial steady state and for selected years of the calibration
period with the cross-sectional profiles derived from HILDA is available from authors upon request.
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4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we report on the implications of several budget repair measures to either im-
mediately or gradually eliminate the 2014 budget deficit. As shown in Figure 1, under the
immediate elimination, the budget deficit is set to zero in 2015, whereas the gradual elimina-
tion of the 2014 budget deficit follows the projected path to budget surpluses by Australian
Government (2015). Further note that under the gradual consolidation plan, the budget surplus
of 0.4% of GDP projected by the government for 2026 is assumed to decline at a constant rate
to reach zero in 2030. After 2030, similarly to the immediate fiscal consolidation plan, there is
no longer budget surplus or deficit.
The results for key macroeconomic variables and for welfare across and within generations
are presented with respect to the baseline transition with the deficit path that is also plotted
in Figure 1. We first outline some of the key macroeconomic effects of the baseline transition
and then we proceed to the discussion of the macroeconomic and welfare implications of the
three budget repair measures under the immediate and gradual eliminations of the 2014 budget
deficit.
Insert Figure 1 around here
4.1 Baseline transition
The baseline transition includes the calibration period of 2009-14 (that matches the composition
of the government budget as discussed in the previous section) and the remaining period from
2015 to a new steady state in 2150. In that remaining period of the baseline transition, we keep
the budget deficit as % of GDP observed in 2014 unchanged and only adjust public consumption
to balance the government budget with an increasing net debt and interest payments. From
now on, we will concentrate on the implications over the period from 2015 to 2150.
Table 4 reports the macroeconomics effects in the selected years of the baseline transition
and in the long run that relates to year 2150. The results are presented as percentage changes
in de-trended, per capita variables relative to year 2014, with net government debt expressed
in % of GDP. The table also shows the values for the selected variables in 2014, which are
reported in units of $100, 000 and as per capita for all the monetary variables, as per capita
and in efficiency units for labour supply and in % of GDP for net government debt.
Insert Table 4 around here
The results for the baseline transition in Table 4 can be summarized as follows. First, net
government debt increases significantly during the transition despite the reductions in public
consumption that is required to keep the budget deficit constant at 3.07% of GDP. In the long
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run, net government debt reaches 98.27% of GDP and is more than 8 times larger than in the
base year of 2014.14 Second, the large increases in net government debt are shown be funded
from abroad through capital imports, which lead to significant decreases in net foreign assets
during the baseline transition. As shown in Table 4, net foreign assets decrease by 136.5% in
the long run relative to 2014.15 Third, in our small open economy, these substantial changes
in government debt and foreign assets have no impact on the domestic interest rate and so the
effects of the baseline transition on the other key macroeconomic and fiscal variables reported
in Table 4 are relatively small.16
4.2 Two fiscal consolidation plans
We now consider two fiscal consolidation plans: immediate one in which the government elim-
inates the 2014 budget deficit immediately in 2015 and gradual one in which the government
eliminates the 2014 budget deficit gradually over the period of 15 years (see Figure 1).
4.2.1 Implementation
The government is assumed to have three fiscal measures to finance each of the two consolida-
tion plans: (i) the income tax rates, (ii) the consumption tax rate and (iii) transfer payments.17
The adjustments in income or consumption taxes or transfer payments are made to balance
the government budget constraint in (6) from year 2015 onwards. While it is straightforward
to implement the consumption tax adjustments via temporary increases in the effective con-
sumption tax rate, τ ct , additional assumptions need to be made for the other two measures. In
the case of the income tax adjustments, we assume a proportional increase or decrease in the
14As pointed out before, the steady state debt to GDP ratio is implied by the assumed deficit to GDP ratio
and the rates of population growth and technological progress. Note that the higher these growth rates are the
smaller government debt to GDP ratio would be for the given budget deficit to GDP ratio.
15The negative value for net foreign assets in 2014 implies net foreign debt, which increases significantly
during the transition due to capital inflows that finance increased public borrowing depicted by a growing net
government debt.
16In a small open economy model with the exogenous domestic interest rate, the marginal products of capital
and labour as well as the capital labour ratio are unchanged in the long run. Hence, the change in labour supply
must be matched by the change in the capital stock in the long run. The observed difference between the long
run effects on labour and capital in Table 4 is due to the changes in the effective tax rate on firm’s profits (that
are to match observed company tax revenues in % of GDP) during the calibration period of 2009-14, which
alter the capital labour ratio in the long run.
17We also consider two alternative tax measures to repair the government budget: (i) temporary levy on
labour income and (ii) temporary levy on total assets income. The macroeconomic and welfare effects of these
two alternative budget repair measures are discussed in the appendix (at the end of this paper), with further
details relegated to the online technical appendix.
18
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
progressive income tax function through a scalar, λt, that is calculated as
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In the case of the transfer payment measure, a similar scalar is computed to adjust (temporarily
cut) the transfer payments (TRt = Pt + STt) to finance the deficit reductions.
We assume that the government announces each fiscal consolidation plan (as depicted by
Figure 1) at the beginning of 2015 and that both plans are unanticipated by existing households.
This means that the existing households of different ages and income types (alive in 2015)
unexpectedly learn about the government’s fiscal consolidation plans and re-optimize their
labour supply, consumption and saving decisions over their remaining lifetimes. Note that
these households are endowed with their assets that they accumulated in 2014 prior to the fiscal
consolidation. We take these assets from the simulation of the baseline transition. Further note
that all the existing and future born households are assumed to have perfect foresight about
the future tax or transfer changes required to repair the government budget.
4.2.2 The effects of an immediate plan
Macroeconomic effects. The simulation results of the three budget repair measures for
the key macroeconomic variables under the immediate fiscal consolidation plan are provided
in Table 5. The table shows these effects as percentage changes in the selected per capita
variables in the selected years of the transition and in the long run with respect to the baseline
results. Recall that the baseline transition assumed the actual budget deficit of 3.07% of GDP
in 2014 to stay unchanged during the period of 2015-2150. The long run effects in Table 5 then
compare the implications in the new policy and baseline steady states and essentially can be
approximated by the results for year 2150.
Insert Table 5 around here
As expected, the immediate fiscal consolidation leads to either significant tax hikes or trans-
fer payment cuts initially. For instance, in 2015 (when the budget deficit is completely elim-
inated), the required tax hike is 42.42% in progressive income tax rates or 55.9% in the con-
sumption tax rate. Alternatively, the required cut in transfer payments to households in 2015
amounts to almost 40%. In the subsequent transitional years, the required tax hikes or transfer
payment cuts start to moderate. Eventually, all three fiscal adjustments result in the reduced
tax rates or increased transfer payments. As shown in Table 5, the immediate (as well as the
gradual) fiscal consolidation leads to a reduction of 14.3% in the consumption tax rate or an
18Note that under the immediate consolidation plan, the budget deficit is set to zero, ∆Dt = 0 for t =
2015, ...,∞.
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increase of 8.6% in the transfer payments in the long run. This long run result of lower tax
rates or higher transfer payments is due to reduced net government debt, which initially fur-
ther increases from 12.8% of GDP in 2014 to around 15% of GDP in 2015. However, as the
government eliminates the budget deficit and then pays off interest payments and the princi-
ple, net government debt starts to decline, converging to zero in the new steady state of each
fiscal policy measure.19 The results also indicate that reduced government debt leads to large
increases in net foreign assets (i.e., reductions in net foreign debt).
Table 5 reveals quite distinct impacts on key macroeconomic variables such as per capita
labour supply among the three fiscal policy adjustments. Let’s first consider the two tax mea-
sures to finance this immediate fiscal consolidation plan. Both tax measures have negative
effects on per capita labour supply initially, but the negative impact effect of the distortive,
income tax hikes is much greater (6.55% decline) than that due to the less distortive, consump-
tion tax hikes (0.26% decline). Similarly, in the medium run the progressive income tax hikes
generate significant declines in per capita labour supply, output and domestic assets, whereas
the impact of the consumption tax hikes on the economy is relatively modest. In the long run,
however, zero government debt allows for a reduction in income tax rates (by 12.67% relative
to the baseline transition), providing labour supply and saving incentives and leading to higher
per capita labour supply and domestic assets.
The implications of the temporary cuts to transfer payments are positive for per capita
labour supply on impact (in 2015) as well as in the medium run. This is due to the reduced
income effect on household labour supply that these payments (i.e., social transfers to house-
holds aged j < 65 and age pension payments to households aged j ≥ 65) generate. In the long
run, the implications for most macro variables are opposite as is the adjustment in transfer
payments (8.6% increase). For example, the long run decreases in per capita labour supply and
domestic assets from higher transfer payments are 0.74% and 3.08%, respectively.
Table 5 also shows that while the aforementioned effects on net government debt are very
similar across the three budget repair policies, the effects on other selected fiscal variables (e.g.,
income and consumption tax revenues and pension expenditure) differ greatly, depending on
the underlying fiscal policy instrument that finances the fiscal consolidation. For example, the
consumption tax hike in 2015 raises the consumption tax revenue by 48.6% in the same year.
In the long run when the tax rate is lower, the consumption tax revenue declines by 13.1%
relative to the baseline result with the unchanged consumption tax rate.
Welfare effects. We calculate standard equivalent variations to measure the effects of the
three examined budget repair measures on welfare across generations and skill types. These
calculations measure the proportional percentage increase/decrease in consumption and leisure
for each generation (over the remaining life span) that is needed during the baseline transition
19Recall that the net government debt to GDP ratio reaches almost 100% of GDP in the new steady state of
the baseline transition with the budget deficit of 3.07% of GDP.
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with the constant deficit to GDP ratio (as in 2014) to produce the realized remaining lifetime
utility in each reform scenario (for more detailed information, see Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987), p.87).
Figure 2 depicts the distributional and average welfare effects of the immediate fiscal consol-
idation plan. Panels 2a-2c present percentage changes in the remaining utility for each income
quintile of every generation relative to the remaining utility level under the baseline transition.
In order to compare the three fiscal adjustments, Panel 2d plots the intergenerational welfare
effects averaged over the five skill classes.20
Insert Figure 2 around here
Several observations can be drawn from these welfare results. First, all existing generations
alive in 2015 (i.e., cohorts aged 21-90 years) when the deficit is eliminated attain welfare losses.
Figure 2d shows that the welfare losses are particularly large in the case of temporary transfer
payment cuts, with some older cohorts loosing, on average, up to 12% of remaining resources due
to reductions in their pension payments. The temporary increases in the consumption tax rate
have also negative effects on the welfare of older generations. Although the magnitude of these
effects is much smaller than those observed for the transfer payment cuts, the consumption
tax hikes are more negative for the welfare of older households than the income tax hikes.
This is simply because all cohorts pay the consumption tax, whereas the income taxes are
predominantly paid by the working-age cohorts.
Second, while all the existing generations bear the welfare costs of this immediate fiscal
consolidation due to required tax hikes or transfer payment cuts, future generations experience
welfare gains. As shown in Figure 2d (and Table B2 for the average welfare), in the long run,
generations gain, on average, 0.76% or 0.51% in their lifetime resources because of the transfer
payment adjustments or the tax adjustments, respectively. Note that the tax hikes or transfer
payment cuts to fund the fiscal consolidation are only temporary, with the long run elimination
of public debt resulting in reverse changes in these policy instruments. Consequently, the
long run tax cuts or transfer payment increases have positive effects on the welfare of future
generations.
Third, Figures 2a-2c display interesting differences in the intra-generational welfare effects
across the three fiscal policy measures. The consumption tax hikes and in particular the
transfer payment cuts are more negative for the welfare of lower income types of the existing
cohorts. This is due to the regressive nature of the flat consumption tax rate and because
reduced transfer payments represent an important income source for low income households.
For instance, in the case of the transfer payment cuts, some older cohorts in the lowest quintile
20The numerical values for the welfare effects of these budget repair measures on selected generations are
displayed in Table B2 in the appendix. That table also provides a comparison with the welfare effects under
the gradual consolidation plan and of two alternative budget repair measures.
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experience welfare losses of 13.3% in their remaining resources, while the welfare losses for the
same age cohorts in the highest quintile do not exceed 2.7% (see the results for the cohort aged
80 in 2015 in Table B2).
Conversely, the temporary increases in the income tax rates, which are progressive, reduce
the welfare of higher income types more than the welfare of lower income types. Panel 3a
shows welfare losses more than 2% in remaining utility for some young and middle age cohorts
in the highest quintile but only less than 0.2% welfare losses for the same age generations in
the lowest quintile. In the long run, the reverse effects on each of the fiscal policy instruments
(i.e., either tax cuts or transfer payment increases balancing the government budget with no
public debt) produce opposing distributional welfare effects to those during the fiscal consoli-
dation. Specifically, the highest income households of future generations born after the fiscal
consolidation benefit the most from the income tax cuts (with long run welfare up by almost
1.1% in lifetime resources), whereas future generations in the lowest quintile attain the highest
welfare gain (almost 1.4% in the long run) under the transfer payment policy.
4.2.3 The effects of a gradual plan
Macroeconomic effects. Table 6 reports the macroeconomic effects of the three budget repair
measures under the gradual elimination of the 2014 budget deficit, as projected by Australian
Government (2015). Similarly to the results for the immediate consolidation plan, the effects
are presented as percentage changes in the selected per capita variables in the selected years of
the transition and in the long run with respect to the baseline results.
Insert Table 6 around here
Table 6 indicates that while the long run macroeconomic effects are the same irrespective
of the budget deficit being eliminated immediately or gradually, the short run and transitional
effects differ greatly between the two fiscal consolidation plans. For instance, under the gradual
consolidation plan, the required 2015 tax hike is only 0.21% in progressive income tax rates
and 6.93% in the consumption tax rate (compared to the same year tax hikes of 42.4% and
55.9% under the immediate fiscal consolidation plan reported in Table 5). However, in 2020
when the government budget returns to a surplus under the gradual plan, the required tax
hikes are 42.61% in average income tax rates or 52.15% in the consumption tax rate, which
are significantly higher tax hikes than those under the immediate plan in 2020. Similarly, the
required cut in transfer payments under the gradual plan is only 5.42% in 2015, whereas the
cut in 2020 amounts to almost 36%.
The results for this gradual plan indicate that there are important announcement effects as
households foresee significant future tax hikes and adjust their lifecycle behaviour accordingly.
This is particularly apparent in the case of the income tax adjustments, which result in a
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2.07% increase in per capita labour supply in 2015 (compared to a 6.55% decline in per capita
labour supply under the immediate plan). As mentioned, the households alive in 2015 foresee
significant income tax hikes to be implemented in the near future (e.g., in 2020) and so they
increase their labour supply (and savings) initially when the tax rates are still relatively low.
However, when the large increases in the progressive income tax rates are actually adopted,
households work less, resulting in a decline in per capita labour supply of 6.64% in 2020 under
the gradual consolidation plan.
Welfare effects. The distributional and average welfare effects of the three budget repair
measures financing this gradual fiscal consolidation plan are displayed in Figure 3. The results
measure equivalent variations (comparing each reform scenario with the baseline transition) for
households of different ages in 2015 and of different skill types.
Insert Figure 3 around here
The comparison of Figures 2 and 3 indicates that, while the welfare effects on future gen-
erations are similar (the same in the long run) for the two fiscal consolidation plans, there are
some important differences in relation to the welfare effects on the existing households. These
differences are particularly significant for some older households under the consumption tax and
transfer payment policy measures. As shown in Figure 3d, the transfer payment cut generates
an average welfare loss of 1.5% for the oldest generation (aged 90 in 2015). This welfare loss is
significantly smaller compared to the average loss of 12% reported in Figure 2d for the same age
cohort with the transfer payment cut funding the immediate fiscal consolidation plan. Similarly,
the consumption tax hikes reduce the average welfare of the oldest generation by 0.2% under
the gradual plan and by 2% under the immediate plan. Therefore, the gradual elimination of
the 2014 budget deficit helps to mitigate the negative welfare effects that especially cuts in
transfer payments and consumption tax hikes have on some very old cohorts and lower income
classes.
4.2.4 Lump sum redistributive authority (LSRA)
The analysis of the two consolidation plans indicates opposing welfare effects across generations
and income groups. Indeed, there are welfare trade-offs between current and future generations
and between the rich and poor. This implies political constraints when implementing a fiscal
consolidation plan.
To assess the efficiency implications of the two consolidation plans, we follow Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) and Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) to introduce a system of income transfers
administered by a hypothetical Lump Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA). In a nutshell,
the LSRA undertakes lump sum redistributions across all generations and household types (via
lump sum transfers or taxes) to ensure that (i) the utility levels of households alive at the time
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of the policy announcement remain at their pre-reform levels and (ii) the lifetime utility levels
of the future-born generations are raised or reduced by a uniform amount. The additional lump
sum transfers (or taxes) to the future-born generations are determined so that the present value
of all lump sum transfers (taxes) at the time of the policy announcement is zero. In the case
of an increase in the lifetime utility of the future-born generations, the given policy change is
said to generate an efficiency gain and is weakly Pareto improving in the sense that the welfare
of some (future) households increases while no households are worse off.
Table 7 displays the aggregate efficiency implications. It appears that the immediate plan
dominates the gradual plan in terms of efficiency gains and the income tax is the most efficient
financing instrument. Overall the two consolidation plans result in Pareto improving, under the
assumed redistributive mechanism, generating an aggregate efficiency gain of at least 0.209%
or $3,800 in initial resources for all income types.
Insert Table 7 around here
The increase in aggregate efficiency arises because of the reduction in the deadweight losses
associated with the higher taxes to finance the burden of increasing government debt during
the baseline transition. The fiscal consolidation plans result in smaller (and eventually no) gov-
ernment debt in the future, which allows government to cut taxes, thus reducing tax distortions
and benefiting to more populous future-born generations. This reduction creates an efficiency
gain that can be redistributed via lump-sum transfers by the LSRA to generate a potential
Pareto improvement in welfare.
The overall efficiency gain implies that the government can devise a redistribution program
to overcome the political challenge caused by the opposing welfare effects. That is, the gov-
ernment could compensate welfare losses attained by the current generations, while achieving
better wellbeing of future generations.21
5 Sensitivity analysis
This section provides a sensitivity analysis of the long run steady state results for key macroe-
conomic aggregates reported in Section 4 to alternative assumptions of the model. The mod-
ifications of our benchmark model include: (i) imperfect capital mobility with an endogenous
domestic interest rate; (ii) an economic slowdown via a reduced rate of technical progress; (iii)
21One should also notice large initial LSRA debt also reported in Table 7. For example, the initial LSRA debt
due to compensating the current generations amounts to over 50% of GDP when income tax adjustments are
used to repair the government budget. In our small open economy model, the LSRA debt is funded via capital
imports from abroad and has no impact on the domestic interest rate. Relaxing this small open economy
assumption would mean that such large LSRA debt would increase the domestic interest rate, leading to
capital shallowing with negative implications for wages of future-born generations. Thus, the positive efficiency
implications that we find are to some extent conditional on our small open economy setup.
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an ageing demographic environment with improved survival probabilities and reduced popu-
lation growth; and (iv) a Cobb-Douglas production function and no capital adjustment costs.
Given the focus of this section on the long run effects, we do not distinguish between the im-
mediate and gradual eliminations of the 2014 budget deficit, as the long run results of the two
plans are the same.
5.1 Endogenous interest rate
Our benchmark model described in Section 2 made the assumption that the domestic interest
rate was equal to the exogenously given world interest rate. We now relax this small open
economy assumption and examine the effects of the three budget repair measures by assuming
imperfect capital mobility with an endogenous domestic interest rate. In this setting, the
domestic interest rate, rt, is determined as
rt = r − γ
(
AFt /Yt − AF2014/Y2014
)
,
where r is the exogenous world interest rate (= 4%), AFt /Yt is the ratio of net foreign assets to
GDP and the parameter γ > 0 gives responsiveness to the changes in AFt /Yt. Following Guest
(2006), we set γ to 0.02. Under this specification, the domestic interest rate will fall (increase)
if the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP increases (decreases). In contrast to the small open
economy assumption, this imperfect capital mobility framework implies that the capital labour
ratio and the total wage rate faced by firms will also change in the long run, and so the long run
changes in the capital stock, labour supply and output will differ. The effects that we discuss
below may be thought of as being similar to those derived from a closed economy model.
Table 8 shows the sensitivity of the long run macroeconomic effects by comparing the
effects derived from this endogenous interest rate framework with the long run effects from
our benchmark model discussed in Section 4. The table also compares the two interest rate
frameworks under the baseline transition assumption with the 2014 budget deficit to GDP
ratio. The results for this baseline transition assumption indicate a long run increase of 13.77%
in the domestic interest rate, which is due to reduced net foreign assets (or higher net foreign
debt that funds an increasing government debt). However, relative to the small open economy
results, Table 8 indicates that net foreign assets increase significantly as the higher interest rate
leads to larger domestic assets and lower capital stock. Per capita labour supply is shown to
further decline in the endogenous interest rate framework, which is due to work disincentives
from the reduced wage rate. Consequently, as both inputs to production fall, the effect on GDP
per capita is more negative than in the small open economy. The long run government debt
amounts to 98.27% of GDP in both economies, and thus the displayed difference in Table 8 is
zero.22
22Recall that the net government debt to GDP ratio in the long run is implied by the given deficit to GDP
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Insert Table 8 around here
The effects of the examined budget repair measures are positive for most macroeconomic
variables relative to those derived from the small open economy model. For example, the
long run capital stock, labour supply, GDP and consumption per capita all increase in this
imperfect capital mobility framework. These positive effects are due to improved net foreign
assets that cause the domestic interest rate to decline. The reduced interest rate increases
investment demand and leads to a larger capital stock. The resulting capital deepening then
generates a positive effect on the wage rate, which provides further incentives for households to
increase their labour supply. Consequently, both labour supply and GDP per capita increase.
The reduced interest rate, however, implies a lower rate of return on assets, leading to smaller
domestic assets than in our benchmark model. The relative net foreign assets are then shown
to decline as more capital inflows are needed to support the increased capital stock.23 The
long run results in Table 8 also indicate a larger tax cut or a larger transfer payment increase
resulting from the government debt elimination when the domestic interest rate is endogenous.
5.2 Economic slowdown
Recent economic projections for Australia indicate that the economy could stay in unfavourable
macroeconomic conditions for quite a while (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2015). How
would economic slowdown affect key macroeconomic and fiscal variables, including the level
of net government debt in the long run? And how would the macroeconomic effects of the
examined budget repair measures presented in Section 4 alter in a situation when the economy
experiences a slowdown? This subsection aims to provide answers to these questions. Specifi-
cally, we consider a scenario in which the economy has a lower annual rate of technical progress
set to 1% compared to the technical change of 1.5% assumed in our benchmark model.
Table 9 compares the long run macroeconomic results for the baseline transition (with the
2014 budget deficit of 3.07% of GDP) and the three budget repair measures (with zero budget
deficit) generated by the modified model with lower technical progress with those derived from
the benchmark model. In our model, altering technical progress rate, g, affects household
behaviour through changes in (i) earning ability profile, eij, and (ii) time endowment, h
i
j,t. Any
reduction in g flattens the earning ability profile, thus reducing the effective wage rate for each
quintile over the lifecycle, as well as making younger households relatively less productive than
older households.
Insert Table 9 around here
ratio (3.07% of GDP) and by exogenous rates of population growth and technical progress.
23Note that in both economies all three budget repair measures lead to increased net foreign assets in the long
run. However, the long run improvements are larger in the small open economy. This is because the reduced
government debt has no impact on the domestic interest rate and so it has much smaller impacts on domestic
assets and the capital stock than in this modified model with an endogenous interest rate.
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The ”baseline transition” results in Table 9 show significant declines in long run per capita
labour supply, capital stock, GDP and consumption due to lower g. Notice that we report
the impact on effective labour supply, which decreases directly due to the reduced labour
productivity and indirectly because of the dominating substitution effect on households’ hours
of work from the reduced labour productivity. Interestingly, the stock of domestic assets is
shown to increase compared to our benchmark model. The intuition behind this result is that
younger households save more due to lower expected future earnings, generating higher average
domestic assets. In retirement, however, total assets are smaller compared to the economy with
higher g, resulting in the increased expenditure on the means tested pension.
Economic slowdown modelled through reduced g directly affects net government debt that
increases by additional 19 percentage points of GDP relative to the benchmark model simulation
of the baseline transition.24 The reduced tax revenues and increased expenditures on pensions
and interest payments require further cuts in government consumption that is assumed to clear
the government budget constraint during the baseline transition.
The comparison of the long run effects of eliminating the budget deficit and net debt re-
veals that these effects vary greatly across the three fiscal measures. Nevertheless, there are
two results that are common for each fiscal policy measure. First, the elimination of larger
government debt in the economy with reduced growth allows for a more significant tax cut or
transfer payment increase in the long run. As a result, positive long run effects on consumption
per capita are larger than those obtained from our benchmark model. For instance, Table 9
shows that the additional 5.95 percentage point increase in transfer payments generates a fur-
ther 0.47 percentage point increase in per capita consumption. Second, the elimination of larger
government debt (relative to net debt in the economy with higher g) leads greater improvement
in foreign investment position, as indicated by the further increase in net foreign assets. As
for the differences in macro effects between the two tax measures, the long run reduction in
distortive, income tax rates have positive and significant effects on labour supply and especially
domestic assets, while the additional long run consumption tax cut leads to insignificant macro
effects and the additional long run transfer payment increase reduces per capita labour supply
and domestic assets in comparison with the results reported in Section 4.
5.3 Population ageing
Similarly to other developed countries, population ageing in Australia is expected to accelerate
in the next several decades, reducing population growth and generating a significantly higher
proportion of the elderly in the total population. In this subsection, we examine the long run
macroeconomic effects of keeping the existing budget deficit to GDP ratio unchanged (as under
24In the long run steady state, the net government debt to GDP ratio equals to Deficit GDP/ (n+ g + ng) ,
which with g = 1%, n = 1.6% and Deficit GDP = 3.07% implies net government debt of 117.35% of GDP,
compared to 98.27% of GDP reported in Section 4.
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the baseline transition) and of the three fiscal policy measures (with zero budget deficit) in an
ageing environment. Specifically, we set the age-specific survival probabilities, pij, to those from
the medium population projections by Productivity Commission (2013) for year 2050. We then
calculate the annual rate of population growth, n, to generate an old-age dependency ratio of
0.40 taken from their projections for 2050. The implied annual population growth rate is about
0.67% - less than half of the growth rate in our benchmark model.
We report the results in Table 10 as the percentage point deviations in selected macro
variables in the long run steady states with ageing from those derived from our benchmark
model with the current demographic structure. The ”baseline transition” results indicate that
in an ageing environment, domestic assets increase significantly (due to increased longevity and
proportion of older households with large asset holdings) but labour supply and output (due to
a reduced proportion of the working age population).25 The decline in the population growth
rate implies a higher net government debt to GDP ratio, which increases to over 140% of GDP
in the long run (43.11 percentage point increase relative to the long run net debt reported in
Table 4). The increased interest payment on government debt and especially the increased
government expenditure on the age pension require further cuts in public consumption, which
declines by additional 12.46 percentage points to balance the government budget in this ageing
economy. The large fiscal costs of population aging are consistent with the results from other
studies for the U.S., Australia and Japan by Kitao (2014), Kudrna et al. (forthcoming), Hsu
and Yamada (forthcoming), respectively.
Insert Table 10 around here
Table 10 also indicates that in the ageing economy, the elimination of the budget deficit
and of the greater government debt leads to (i) a further increase in net foreign assets and (ii)
an additional long run tax (transfer payment) cut (increase), which has positive impact per
capita consumption, labour supply and domestic assets. These long run effects are qualitatively
similar to those reported in Table 9 for the reduced economic growth scenario.
5.4 Alternative technologies
We also conduct a sensitivity analysis of two alternative assumptions related to the production
sector: (i) Cobb-Douglas production function and (ii) abstracting from capital adjustment
costs. In this subsection, we briefly summarize the main findings for these two sensitivity checks,
with the results being presented and discussed in detail in the online technical appendix.
Production function. In our benchmark model, we assume a CES production technology
with σ = 0.78. The Cobb-Douglas function commonly used in the literature is nested as a
25For a detailed analysis of the economic effects of demographic transition in Australia see Kudrna et al.
(2015).
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special case of the general CES specification. We check our results, using a Cobb-Douglas
production function (where σ = 1). Note that we keep all other model assumptions (including
the capital adjustment cost assumption) unchanged.
We first compute the baseline transition, which assumes the budget deficit to GDP ratio from
2015 onwards to stay constant, as observed in 2014. We find that the macroeconomic effects
during the baseline transition are very similar when comparing our benchmark model and this
alternative model with a Cobb-Douglas production technology. We then simulate the gradual
fiscal consolidation with income tax adjustments, using this alternative model with a Cobb-
Douglas technology. We find that the effects on most macroeconomic variables are relatively
smaller compared to those derived from our benchmark model with the CES technology, but
the differences are very small.
Adjustment cost. In this sensitivity check, we compute the baseline and fiscal consoli-
dation transition paths, using the CES production function (as in the benchmark model) but
abstracting from capital adjustment costs. The differences in the macroeconomic effects during
the baseline transition are very small, when comparing our benchmark model and this alter-
native (see the online technical appendix for the numerical results). Given that increasing net
government debt has no impact on the domestic interest rate, the implications on the economy
are rather small under all simulated baseline transition paths.
However, comparing the results for the gradual fiscal consolidation with income tax ad-
justments reveals that there are more pronounced differences in the magnitude of some of the
reported variables derived from the models with and without adjustment costs in the short
run and over the transition. As discussed, in the small open economy model (with perfect
capital mobility) without any capital adjustment costs, the changes in labour supply have to
be exactly matched by the changes in the capital stock (because of the constant capital-labour
ratio that is determined by the exogenous and constant world interest rate). As a direct result,
the macroeconomic implications in the model without adjustment costs are more pronounced,
driven entirely by the changes in labour supply.
5.5 Summary of sensitivity results
This section has examined the sensitivity of the long run macroeconomic effects derived from
our benchmark model to (i) alternative market structure, (ii) alternative economic growth, (iii)
alternative demographic structure, and (iv) alternative production sector. Although we show
that these alternative specifications and assumptions of the model generate some differences
in the magnitude of the long run macroeconomic effects, the general thrust of the examined
budget repair measures remain intact (at least in the long run). In other words, the robustness
tests undertaken in this section have revealed that the direction of long run macroeconomic
impacts of the examined fiscal policy options was largely unaffected.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have quantified and compared the macroeconomic and welfare effects of
the immediate and gradual fiscal consolidation plans funded by either temporary tax hikes or
transfer payment cuts in the context of a small open economy. Using a computable, general
equilibrium OLG model calibrated to match both the macroeconomic and household lifecycle
data in Australia, we find that, while all the examined budget repair options achieve the
same fiscal goal, the macroeconomic and welfare outcomes differ significantly. Specifically, the
current generations would not support any fiscal austerity measures because they are worse
off by having their transfer payment cut or having to pay higher taxes. Our results suggest
interesting outcomes when choosing between temporary transfer payment cuts or tax increases
to fund the fiscal consolidation. Cutting transfer payments results in the worst welfare losses
for the current generations (especially older and low skill households), but generates the highest
welfare gain for the future generations.
Our results carry implications for designing a feasible fiscal consolidation strategy for Aus-
tralia. Even though the long-run benefits of the budget repair strategies examined in this paper
are undeniable, the transitional costs to the economy and welfare are significant and unavoid-
able. The budget repair measures are indeed challenging policy choices for a better future in
Australia. Our results consistently suggest that none of the examined fiscal austerity measures
are politically feasible as they will likely fail to gain the political support of current genera-
tions. The conflict of interest between the current and future generations suggests political
infeasibility for any fiscal consolidation plan alone. However, we have shown that in a small
open economy framework, it is possible to devise a fiscal consolidation plan coupled with a
compensation scheme for the current generations to achieve better living standard for future
generations.
Our dynamic general equilibrium framework with overlapping generations can be applied
to study the effects of structural tax reforms proposed by the recent Henry Taxation Review
(AFTS, 2010). Notice that, in our paper we abstract from altruistic motives, so that there
are no intended bequests and other forms of intergenerational transfers through family line.
Introducing this type of intergenerational transfers creates a new channel that links the welfare
of current generations to that of future generations, which might affect welfare outcomes and
increase political support by current generations for the fiscal consolidation plan. It also needs to
be pointed out that our analysis only considers the examined budget repair strategies separately,
while the government may implement a combination (mix) of such fiscal policy options designed
to ensure that no generation is worse off from the fiscal consolidation. We leave these extensions
for future research.
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Appendix: Alternative budget repair measures
The government has a wide range of policy measures to repair its budget. In this appendix,
we consider two alternative tax measures: a special levy on labour income (i.e., introduction
of a flat payroll tax rate) and a special levy on total assets income (i.e., introduction of a flat
capital income tax rate).26 The effects of these two alternative budget repair measures and the
comparison with the three policy measures examined in Section 4 are discussed below.
Table B1 reports the macroeconomic implications of the two alternative policy measures
as percentages changes in selected transitional years and in the long run relative the baseline
results. The results show significant differences between the two tax hikes as well as between
the two consolidation plans within each tax hike. While the special levy on labour income is
relatively small (9% levy in 2020 under the gradual plan), the capital income levy is significantly
higher (37% levy in 2020 under the gradual plan). This difference is due to (i) total assets
income being smaller than labour income and (ii) more distortive nature of the capital income
tax. Comparing the two consolidation plans, the immediate plan requires a high levy in 2015
(10% levy on labour income or 34% levy on capital income), whereas under the gradual plan,
each levy is initially modest but increases significantly by 2020.
Insert Table B1 around here
Table B1 also shows significant differences in the effects of the two alternative tax measures
on effective labour supply, domestic assets and consumption. For example, the gradual con-
solidation plan with the labour income levy initially increases per capita labour supply (due
to the announcement effects), but the capital income levy generates a significantly decline of
4.34% in labour supply in 2015 relative the baseline result. Notice that under the second policy
measure, households demand not only more leisure but also more consumption, with per capita
consumption increasing by 3.2% in 2015. These two behavioural responses have a very negative
impact on assets accumulation, resulting in large reductions in domestic assets in the medium
run (9.18% decline in 2020 under the gradual plan).
The welfare effects of the two alternative measures and three main policy measures are
displayed in Table B2. The effects are presented for the selected skill type (income quintile)
and for average welfare of four selected cohorts (two current cohorts aged 80 and 40 years in
2015 and two future generations aged 0 and -150). The results for the two alternative measures
indicate that while the labour income levy has no effect on older cohorts (as these households
already retired from work), the capital income levy results in significant losses for older cohorts.
Moreover, the welfare losses are greater for higher income quintiles as they hold larger assets
relative to lower income types. In the long run, the government debt elimination generates a
26Although Australia does not have any payroll tax (paid by workers) and a flat capital income or interest
tax, many countries (e.g., Germany) have such taxes, which motivate the present analysis.
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subsidy on labour or capital income, which produces gains in average welfare and in welfare of
more affluent households (see the result for cohorts aged -150).
Insert Table B2 around here
Table B2 also compares the welfare effects of all five budget repair measures. In terms of
the inter-generational welfare effects, the budget repair measure with transfer payment adjust-
ments results in the highest (average) welfare gain in the long run, followed by the capital
levy/subsidy adjustments. The two fiscal measures, however, produce the worst welfare losses
for current generations. The comparison of the intra-generational welfare effects reveals that
while temporary consumption tax hikes and transfer payment cuts hurt especially the poor,
the income tax hikes generate larger losses for the rich. In the long run, the intra-generational
effects reverse as zero public debt allows for tax cuts or higher transfer payments. In sum, these
welfare trade-offs between different generations, as well as between the rich and poor, highlight
political constraints when implementing a fiscal consolidation plan.
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Figure 1: Budget deficits/surpluses under different fiscal consolidation scenarios 
 
 Notes: The underlying cash balance (budget deficit/surplus) for 2014 and gradual         
 eliminations of budget deficits are taken from Australian Government (2015).  
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Figure 2: Welfare implications of immediate elimination of budget deficits with different policy instruments  
(Percentage changes in welfare relative to baseline transition with unchanged 2014 budget deficit to GDP ratio)   
 
 
Notes: Equivalent variation measures in percent; Oldest (youngest) household in 2015 when the immediate elimination of budget deficits is 
adopted is 90 years (21 years) old. All generations younger than 21 years are born in the subsequent periods of the transition. 
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 90  65  40  20  0  -20  -40  -60  -80  -100  -120
W
e
lfa
re
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 (
in
 %
)
Age in 2015
a) Temporary income tax hikes (Itax)
Low est type
Second type
Third type
Fourth type
Highest type
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 90  65  40  20  0  -20  -40  -60  -80  -100  -120
W
e
lfa
re
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 (
in
 %
)
Age in 2015
b) Temporary consumption tax hikes (Ctax)
Low est type
Second type
Third type
Fourth type
Highest type
-18
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
 0
 2
 90  65  40  20  0  -20  -40  -60  -80  -100  -120
W
e
lfa
re
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 (
in
 %
)
Age in 2015
c) Temporary transfer payment cuts (SocialTR)
Low est type
Second type
Third type
Fourth type
Highest type
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
 0
 2
 90  65  40  20  0  -20  -40  -60  -80  -100  -120
W
e
lfa
re
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 (
in
 %
)
Age in 2015
d) Average w elfare across the quintiles
Itax
Ctax
SocialTR
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Figure 3: Welfare implications of gradual elimination of budget deficits with different policy instruments  
(Percentage changes in welfare relative to baseline transition with unchanged 2014 budget deficit to GDP ratio)   
 
 
Notes: Equivalent variation measures in percent; Oldest (youngest) household in 2015 when gradual reductions of budget deficits are phased in is 
90 years (21 years) old. All generations younger than 21 years are born in the subsequent periods of the transition. 
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Demographics  
   Population growth rate 0.016 Data
   Intra-generational shares All 0.2 Data [a]
   Conditional survival probabilities ABS (2014b) Data
Utility function  
   Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 0.4 Literature [b]
   Intra-temporal elasticity of substitution 0.9 Literature [b]
   Subjective discount factor 0.99 Calibrated 
   Leisure parameter 1.5 Literature [b]
Technology
   Productivity constant 0.872 Calibrated 
   Elasticity of substitution in production 0.778 Calibrated 
   Capital intensity parameter 0.45 Data
   Capital depreciation rate 0.055 Calibrated 
   Adjustment cost parameter 10 Literature [c]
   Technical progress rate 0.015 Data
Table 1: Values of main model parameters
Description Value Source
Notes : [a] Households are disaggregated into income quintiles based on ABS (2007); [b] The values of these 
parameters are similar to Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Fehr (2000); [c] This value is taken from Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1987).
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Statutory rate
(Data) (Data) (Data) (Calibrated) (Calibrated)
(2013-14) (2000-08) (2014) (2000-08) (2014)
Public pension 2.5 2.93
  - Maximum pension p.a. ($) 21,504 - - Down by 10% Up by 3%
  - Income test threshold p.a. ($) 4,056 - -
  - Taper/withdrawal rate (%) 50 - -
Private pension
  - Contribution rate (%) 9.5 - - 9.5 9.5
  - Contribution tax rate (%) 15 0.7 0.5 8.7 6.2
Social welfare transfers - 4 4.59 Calibrated Calibrated
Personal income tax [a] 11.49 10.9 Calibrated Calibrated
Consumption tax (%) 10 6.95 6.4 12.8 11.3
Corporate tax (%) 30 4.7 4.6 27.6 27
Other lump-sum tax - 1.53 1.4 Calibrated Calibrated
Table 2: Calibration of fiscal policy in initial steady state and base year of 2014
Share in  % of GDP Effective rate
Notes : Data from Australian Government (2015); Effective rates derived by adjusting statutory rates to match the corresponding shares 
in % of GDP; [a] The income tax function estimated using 2013-14 progressive income tax schedule.
Variable
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2000-08 2010 2012 2014 2000-08 2010 2012 2014
Private consumption [c] 54.12 56.42 57.08 56.84 57.71 55.38 53.72 55.47
Public consumption [c] 18.87 19.77 17.50 18.86 17.41 18.01 17.88 17.68
Investment [c] 26.54 26.23 26.33 26.53 26.44 27.76 28.18 27.40
Trade balance [c] 0.47 -2.43 -0.91 -2.23 -1.71 -0.97 -0.13 -0.43
Total tax revenue [c] 25.37 22.70 22.80 23.80 25.37 22.70 22.80 23.80
Budget surplus [c] 0.00 -4.21 -2.92 -3.07 0.74 -4.21 -2.92 -3.07
Net government debt [c] 0.00 2.06 9.25 12.13 3.16 3.30 9.90 12.80
Capital to GDP [d] 3.09 3.06 3.08 3.10 3.09 3.16 3.05 3.22
Investment to capital [d] 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Foreign assets to capital [d] -0.17 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17
Table 3: Comparison of model generated values for key variables with Australian data
Variable 
Model generated [a] Australian data [b]
Notes : [a] The model-generated values relate to the initial steady state equilibrium in 2000-08 and to selected years of the calibration 
period in 2009-14; [b] The values are derived from ABS (2014a) and Australian Government (2015), with the values for 2000-08 being 
averages over that period; [c] In % of GDP; [d] Ratio.
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Labour supply 0.356 % 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06
Capital stock 2.351 % -0.04 -0.22 -0.40 -0.50 -0.51
Domestic assets 1.950 % -0.05 -0.23 -0.38 -0.44 -0.68
Net foreign assets -0.485 % -4.22 -23.34 -53.28 -91.16 -136.51
Net government debt [b] 12.130  - 14.74 26.67 45.65 69.85 98.27
Output (GDP) 0.758 % -0.02 -0.09 -0.17 -0.22 -0.22
 - Private consumption 0.431 % -0.03 -0.15 -0.30 -0.33 -0.36
 - Public consumption 0.143 % -0.61 -3.38 -7.65 -12.88 -18.94
Age pension costs 0.022 % 0.10 0.49 0.83 0.87 0.94
Total tax revenue 0.180 % -0.03 -0.16 -0.32 -0.40 -0.43
 - Personal income tax 0.083 % -0.05 -0.26 -0.50 -0.64 -0.69
 - Consumption tax 0.049 % -0.03 -0.15 -0.30 -0.33 -0.36
Notes : [a] The values for monetary variables in 2014 are presented in units of $100,000 and per capita; Labour supply is 
presented in per capita and efficiency units; Net government debt in 2014 and other selected years of the transition is presented 
in % of GDP.
Table 4: Macroeconomic implications during baseline transition 
(Percentage changes in selected detrended per capita variables from year 2014)
Variable 2014 [a] 2015 2020 2030 2050 Long run
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2015 2020 2030
Long 
run
2015 2020 2030
Long 
run
2015 2020 2030
Long 
run
Labour supply -6.55 -5.06 -2.48 0.66 -0.26 -0.13 0.05 -0.11 2.54 1.96 1.28 -0.74
Capital stock 0.00 -1.26 -1.53 0.66 0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.11 0.00 0.55 0.82 -0.74
Domestic assets 0.00 -6.00 -12.79 7.88 0.00 -0.85 -1.71 -0.06 0.00 -0.16 -0.76 -3.08
Net foreign assets 14.27 8.00 7.39 76.82 0.26 14.98 32.25 64.98 -5.92 12.76 32.43 61.19
Government debt [a] 15.42 13.15 9.51 0.00 14.77 12.66 9.30 0.00 14.50 12.47 9.21 0.00
Output (GDP) -4.42 -3.80 -2.16 0.66 -0.17 -0.09 0.05 -0.11 1.67 1.48 1.12 -0.74
 - Consumption -4.11 -4.61 -4.50 2.65 -4.69 -3.94 -2.68 1.38 -3.41 -2.45 -1.18 0.47
Age pension costs 0.40 0.84 2.02 -2.14 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.04 -42.60 -34.34 -21.99 11.08
Total tax revenue 12.95 10.65 7.05 -3.89 12.90 10.56 6.82 -3.62 -0.04 0.18 0.30 -0.58
 - Income tax 34.32 28.88 19.63 -10.40 -0.20 -0.29 -0.31 -0.14 0.60 0.78 0.64 -1.19
 - Consumption tax -4.11 -4.61 -4.50 2.65 48.59 39.91 25.87 -13.13 -3.41 -2.45 -1.18 0.47
Policy instrument [b] 42.42 37.64 26.93 -12.67 55.90 45.65 29.34 -14.31 -39.84 -31.67 -19.42 8.60
Notes : [a] Net government debt presented in % of GDP; [b] The fiscal policy measure to eliminate the 2014 budget deficit immediately in 2015 is either (i) 
income taxation or (ii) consumption tax rate or (iii) transfer payments.
Table 5: Macroeconomic effects of immediate elimination of budget deficit with different policy instruments
(Percentage changes in selected variables from baseline results with unchanged 2014 budget deficit to GDP ratio) 
Variable
(i) Temporary (ii) Temporary (iii) Temporary
     income tax hikes      consumption tax hikes       transfer payment cuts
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2015 2020 2030
Long 
run
2015 2020 2030
Long 
run
2015 2020 2030
Long 
run
Labour supply 2.07 -6.64 -2.96 0.66 0.63 -0.28 0.02 -0.11 1.91 2.02 1.29 -0.74
Capital stock 0.00 -1.61 -2.04 0.66 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.56 0.85 -0.74
Domestic assets 0.00 -1.61 -12.82 7.88 0.00 0.14 -1.61 -0.06 0.00 1.80 -0.42 -3.08
Net foreign assets 11.25 18.63 5.95 76.82 -0.08 10.24 30.48 64.98 -5.62 10.46 31.18 61.19
Government debt [a] 14.55 20.24 11.78 0.00 14.68 19.30 11.35 0.00 14.56 19.05 11.23 0.00
Output (GDP) 1.34 -4.98 -2.65 0.66 0.42 -0.20 0.01 -0.11 1.26 1.52 1.14 -0.74
 - Consumption -1.05 -4.68 -4.77 2.65 -1.25 -4.35 -2.79 1.38 -2.87 -2.41 -1.18 0.47
Age pension costs 0.08 0.63 1.85 -2.14 -0.08 -0.11 0.12 0.04 -7.15 -39.15 -23.06 11.08
Total tax revenue 1.84 12.14 7.39 -3.89 1.92 12.07 7.16 -3.62 -0.09 0.32 0.34 -0.58
 - Income tax 2.16 32.88 20.86 -10.40 0.44 -0.21 -0.34 -0.14 0.59 1.05 0.71 -1.19
 - Consumption tax -1.05 -4.68 -4.77 2.65 5.60 45.53 27.21 -13.13 -2.87 -2.41 -1.18 0.47
Policy instrument [b] 0.21 42.61 29.22 -12.67 6.93 52.15 30.86 -14.31 -5.42 -35.89 -20.33 8.60
Notes : [a] Net government debt presented in % of GDP; [b] The fiscal policy measure to eliminate the 2014 budget deficit gradually is either (i) income 
taxation or (ii) consumption tax rate or (iii) transfer payments.
Table 6: Macroeconomic effects of gradual elimination of budget deficit with different policy instruments
(Percentage changes in selected variables from baseline results with unchanged 2014 budget deficit to GDP ratio) 
Variable
(i) Temporary (ii) Temporary (iii) Temporary
     income tax hikes      consumption tax hikes       transfer payment cuts
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Itax Ctax SocialTR Itax Ctax SocialTR
Efficiency gain [a] 0.444 0.340 0.210 0.434 0.338 0.209
Efficiency gain [b] 0.083 0.062 0.039 0.081 0.061 0.038
Initial LSRA debt [c] 51.32 37.34 36.81 51.19 36.02 35.09
Table 7: Aggregate efficiency implications with LSRA
Variable
Immediate plan Gradual plan
Notes : [a] Measured as % change of initial resources for all income types; [b] Measured as $ change (in units 
of $100,000); [c] Initial annual LSRA debt measured as % of GDP (in 2015).
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Labour supply -0.88 1.54 0.99 0.53
Wage rate -3.39 5.14 4.01 3.61
Capital stock -8.35 13.93 10.46 8.92
Domestic assets 13.14 -14.26 -12.94 -12.81
Net foreign assets 98.75 -37.20 -33.46 -32.15
Net government debt [c] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Interest rate 13.77 -17.36 -13.73 -12.39
Output (GDP) -3.51 5.60 4.12 3.32
 - Private consumption -1.26 3.43 2.42 1.69
Age pension costs -2.58 2.40 2.70 9.74
Total tax revenue -0.34 -1.79 -1.76 0.12
 - Personal income tax -1.91 -3.33 2.34 1.45
 - Consumption tax -1.26 3.43 -6.85 1.69
Policy instrument -2.63 -6.56 -8.60 5.42
Notes : [a] Deficit of 3.07% of GDP kept unchanged with adjustments in public consumption reported under "Policy instrument"; 
[b] Long run deficit of 0% of GDP with adjustments in (i) income taxation, (ii) consumption tax rate or (iii) social transfers; [c] 
Deviation in net debt to GDP ratio. 
Table 8: Sensitivity of long run macroeconomic effects to imperfect capital mobility
(% point differences between long run results with endogenous and exogenous interest rates)
Variable
Baseline 
transition [a]
Policy instrument to eliminate budget deficit [b]
(i) Income tax rates
(ii) Consumption 
tax rate
(iii) Social transfers 
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Labour supply -7.01 0.31 -0.09 -0.47
Capital stock -6.98 0.31 -0.09 -0.47
Domestic assets 8.41 7.65 -0.04 -2.01
Net foreign assets 50.78 48.79 26.96 21.59
Net government debt [c] 19.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
Output (GDP) -7.00 0.31 -0.09 -0.47
 - Private consumption -2.82 2.33 1.12 0.47
Age pension costs 20.38 -1.76 0.02 7.10
Total tax revenue -5.31 -3.44 -3.09 -0.35
 - Personal income tax -6.76 -9.44 -0.11 -0.89
 - Consumption tax -2.82 2.33 -10.59 0.47
Policy instrument -12.72 -11.07 -11.27 5.95
Notes : [a] Deficit of 3.07% of GDP kept unchanged with adjustments in public consumption reported under "Policy instrument"; 
[b] Long run deficit of 0% of GDP with adjustments in (i) income taxation, (ii) consumption tax rate or (iii) social transfers; [c] 
Deviation in net debt to GDP ratio. 
Table 9: Sensitivity of long run macroeconomic effects to economic slowdown
(% point differences between long run results with technical change of 1% and 1.5%)
Variable
Baseline 
transition [a]
Policy instrument to eliminate budget deficit [b]
(i) Income tax rates
(ii) Consumption 
tax rate
(iii) Social transfers 
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Labour supply -4.57 0.56 -0.19 -1.16
Capital stock -4.55 0.56 -0.19 -1.16
Domestic assets 34.94 14.66 -0.09 -4.69
Net foreign assets 105.46 172.51 96.14 74.22
Net government debt [c] 43.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Output (GDP) -4.56 0.56 -0.19 -1.16
 - Private consumption 2.77 5.43 2.49 0.73
Age pension costs 47.05 -4.18 0.06 16.40
Total tax revenue 1.20 -7.51 -6.63 -1.02
 - Personal income tax 3.01 -19.43 -0.23 -2.13
 - Consumption tax 2.77 5.43 -23.51 0.73
Policy instrument -12.46 -22.34 -24.69 12.29
Notes : [a] Deficit of 3.07% of GDP kept unchanged with adjustments in public consumption reported under "Policy instrument"; 
[b] Long run deficit of 0% of GDP with adjustments in (i) income taxation, (ii) consumption tax rate or (iii) social transfers; [c] 
Deviation in net debt to GDP ratio. 
Table 10: Sensitivity of long run macroeconomic effects to ageing demographic
(% point differences between long run results in ageing and non-ageing economies)
Variable
Baseline 
transition [a]
Policy instrument to eliminate budget deficit [b]
(i) Income tax rates
(ii) Consumption 
tax rate
(iii) Social transfers 
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2015 2020 LR 2015 2020 LR 2015 2020 LR 2015 2020 LR
Labour supply -3.59 -2.28 0.03 2.81 -3.41 0.03 -4.14 -1.97 -0.74 -4.34 -2.77 -0.74
Capital stock 0.00 -0.44 0.03 0.00 -0.70 0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.74 0.00 -0.18 -0.74
Domestic assets 0.00 -4.80 2.34 0.00 0.39 2.34 0.00 -10.51 16.91 0.00 -9.18 16.91
Net foreign assets 5.98 5.19 68.85 3.66 17.21 68.85 3.75 -16.98 94.94 4.94 -20.16 94.94
Government debt [a] 15.10 12.86 0.00 14.48 19.80 0.00 15.16 12.82 0.00 15.18 19.44 0.00
Output (GDP) -2.40 -1.66 0.03 1.84 -2.50 0.03 -2.77 -1.33 -0.74 -2.90 -1.90 -0.74
 - Consumption -4.96 -4.59 1.76 -2.32 -4.93 1.76 3.03 0.94 1.27 3.20 1.59 1.27
Age pension costs 0.50 0.75 -0.83 0.10 0.64 -0.83 -0.14 1.45 -3.87 -0.10 0.93 -3.87
Total tax revenue 12.96 10.64 -3.73 1.78 12.16 -3.73 12.88 10.73 -1.90 2.28 12.16 -1.90
 - Income tax -15.48 -13.21 3.13 1.85 -14.86 3.13 -2.91 -2.97 1.69 -3.06 -3.55 1.69
 - Consumption tax -4.96 -4.59 1.76 -2.32 -4.93 1.76 3.03 0.94 1.27 3.20 1.59 1.27
Policy instrument [b] 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.09 -0.02 0.34 0.33 -0.10 0.09 0.37 -0.10
Notes : [a] Net government debt presented in % of GDP; [b] The fiscal policy instrument to eliminate the 2014 budget deficit is temporary levy on either (i) 
labour income or (ii) capital (total assets) income.
Table B1: Macroeconomic effects of eliminating budget deficit with alternative policy instruments
(Percentage changes in selected detrended variables from baseline results with 2014 budget deficit to GDP ratio) 
Variable
(i) Temporary labour income levy (ii) Temporary capital income levy
Immediate elimination Gradual elimination Immediate elimination Gradual elimination
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Lowest Third Highest Lowest Third Highest
quintile quintile quintile quintile quintile quintile
80 -0.01 -0.06 -0.14 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03
40 -0.18 -0.85 -2.06 -0.80 -0.19 -0.83 -2.00 -0.78
0 -0.14 -0.33 -0.64 -0.30 -0.16 -0.36 -0.70 -0.33
-150 0.18 0.50 1.09 0.47 0.18 0.50 1.09 0.47
80 -1.69 -1.62 -1.54 -1.63 -1.35 -1.31 -1.26 -1.31
40 -1.05 -0.93 -0.88 -0.96 -1.01 -0.90 -0.85 -0.93
0 -0.20 -0.17 -0.15 -0.17 -0.22 -0.19 -0.17 -0.20
-150 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.51
80 -13.33 -6.96 -2.61 -8.49 -10.41 -5.81 -2.41 -6.87
40 -2.72 -0.95 -0.07 -1.48 -2.56 -0.89 -0.06 -1.39
0 -0.45 -0.10 0.02 -0.21 -0.51 -0.12 0.02 -0.24
-150 1.38 0.50 0.02 0.76 1.38 0.50 0.02 0.76
80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
40 -1.04 -1.23 -1.47 -1.19 -0.96 -1.16 -1.40 -1.12
0 -0.35 -0.41 -0.44 -0.38 -0.39 -0.46 -0.49 -0.43
-150 0.46 0.55 0.63 0.53 0.46 0.55 0.63 0.53
80 -0.09 -0.93 -1.60 -0.77 -0.06 -0.67 -1.18 -0.56
40 -0.93 -1.63 -2.03 -1.44 -0.94 -1.69 -2.12 -1.48
0 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06
-150 0.39 0.70 0.87 0.61 0.39 0.70 0.87 0.61
Notes : Standard equivalent variation measures (in %) for selected quintiles and average welfare relative to baseline transition with the government 
deficit to GDP ratio kept constant as in 2014; Age -150 in 2015 shows long run welfare effects.
Table B2: Welfare implications of eliminating budget deficit with different policy instruments
Policy instrument
Age in 
2015
Immediate elimination Gradual elimination
Average 
welfare 
Average 
welfare 
Temporary income 
tax hikes
Temporary 
consumption tax 
hikes
Temporary transfer 
payment cuts
Temporary labour 
income levy
Temporary capital 
income levy
